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Review: Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory 
 
Abstract 
The philosopher Graham Harman argues that contemporary debates about the nature of reality 
as such, and about the nature of objects, in particular, can be meaningfully applied to social 
theory and practice. With Immaterialism, he has recently provided a case-based demonstration 
of how this could happen. But social theorists have compelling reasons to oppose object-
oriented social theory’s fifteen principles. Fidelity to Harman’s aesthetic foundationalism, and 
his particular use of Serial Endosymbiosis Theory as a mechanism of social change, constrain 
the very practices which it is supposed to enable. However, social theory stands to benefit from 
object-oriented philosophy through what we call posthuman relationism – characterized as a 
commitment to the reality of the nonhuman, but not divorced from the human. The emphasis 
in object-oriented social theory on how objects withdraw from cognitive or affective capture 
and representation needs to be tempered by an equal focus on how objects appeal.  
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Introducing Object Oriented Ontology 
 
Graham Harman is the creator and most prolific advocate of Object Oriented Ontology’s 
(OOO’s) dissemination. On his telling, its proponents share two basic commitments: 
 
1. Individual entities of various scales (not just tiny quarks and electrons) are the ultimate stuff 
of the cosmos; 
 
2. These entities are never exhausted by any of their relations, or even by their sum of all 
possible relations. Objects withdraw from any relation. (Harman, 2013a: 7) 
 
 
This philosophy of objects has recently been brought to bear upon social theory. Harman claims 
that his Immaterialism, an intellectual manifesto of sorts, provides sustenance to ‘even the most 
grizzled OOO veteran’ (2016a: 7). This paper assesses the relevance of object-oriented 
ontology to contemporary social theory and practice, especially given Harman’s view that 
‘other disciplines should not be subordinated to philosophy’, as different domains of 
knowledge necessarily compose their objects differently (2012: 138). We begin with an 
overview of object oriented social theory’s philosophical assumptions. Specifically, we 
account for its innovative adaptation of phenomenology, its critique of how objects have been 
failed by philosophy (by under–, over–, and duo–mining), and its insistence upon an aesthetic 
attitude of investigation. We then explain how Immaterialism establishes fifteen axioms of 
object–oriented social theory and propose problems with them. Finally, we argue that object-
oriented social theory lacks the rigor and imaginative potential to envision the ontology of the 
social, and point to another form that better understands the abyssal point between the non-
human and the human. 
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Some of OOO’s intellectual, and most of its sociological offshoots come from the ‘Speculative 
Realism’ conference held at Goldsmiths College in 2007. The event featured the philosopher 
Quentin Meillassoux, who provided this disparate collective of thinkers with a term crystalizing 
an epistemological tendency – ‘correlationism’ – which they unitedly opposed. After Finitude, 
the signature speculative realist text, defines correlationism as: 
 
the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other 
(Meillassoux, 2008a: 5).  
 
Engaging in idiosyncratic forms of realism under the banner of continental philosophy (Ennis, 
2011), the conference’s participants shared few positive philosophical and metaphysical 
commitments. But they did share an antipathy to ‘human-centered’ intellectual traditions, most 
especially phenomenology, postmodernism and vitalism (apart from Iain Hamilton Grant’s 
work which is vitalist in nature). The Goldsmiths’ conference participants opposed the 
dominant anti–realism of Continental philosophy, beholden, as they held it to be, to the 
correlationist mode of regarding objects as meaningful only in relation to human concerns. 
Harman distinguishes his own brand of speculative realism by paradoxically characterizing 
others as excessively materialist; regularly claiming that materialism obscures the true nature 
of objects. His ‘realism without materialism’ (Harman, 2011; Harman & DeLanda, 2016: 3) 
holds it to be the case that objects can only ever be captured obliquely. It is worth foregrounding 
three of that system’s idiosyncrasies. 
 
Post–Phenomenological Realism 
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Firstly, object-oriented ontology is conscientiously post-phenomenological. For Harman, it 
was Heidegger who came closest to understanding that objects could not be adequately 
accessed through a human mode of understanding. Thus, Tool–Being: Heidegger and the 
Metaphysics of Objects (2002) is part critique of anti–realist readings of Heidegger and part 
revelation of Harman’s own metaphysics of objects. Aligned with Heidegger’s opposition to 
reductive materialism, Harman nevertheless believes that Heidegger misunderstood the 
implications of one of his own core insights. In imagining that a broken tool reveals that objects 
are more than how we can possibly represent them, Heidegger is said to fall prey to a distortion 
best captured in the phrase:  
 
We distort [objects] when we see, and distort [objects] when we use (2007a: 177).  
 
The metaphysics of objects developed in Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the 
Carpentry of Things (2005) argues that objects withdraw from all forms of human access and 
representation (2007b: 163). On this point, Harman agrees with Quentin Meillassoux (2008a: 
1) for whom the metaphysical language of an object’s primary and secondary qualities 
decisively marks the limits of human inquiry (Harman, 2011a, 2011b). Secondary qualities, for 
Meillassoux, are those various affective or perceptual effects given by a subject to an object. 
Primary qualities, by contrast, exist apart from the subject (eg size, location, motion, shape); 
they are, ‘indifferent to thought’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 117). Most of object-oriented ontology’s 
development is characterized by a consistent lament for how post–Kantian philosophy in 
general, and Continental philosophy in particular, has abandoned hope of describing objects as 
objects. That objects really withdraw from subjects justifies neither our disbelief in them nor 
our disavowal of their inaccessibility. It rather requires a new appreciation of realism itself – a 
speculative appreciation, which we will discuss later. 
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The Enigma of Objects 
 
Object-oriented ontology’s most emphatic statements are reserved for the absolute autonomy 
of objects: ‘the real’, Harman writes, ‘must be conceived as made up of autonomous individual 
entities’ (2011a: 59). And yet this essential nature of objects is regularly obfuscated, according 
to Harman, by the prevalent strategies of under– and over–mining. To undermine objects means 
to reduce them (most often) to material components, such that their true nature is regarded as 
some underlying substratum or primordial flux, or what Harman simply names a ‘monolithic 
lump’, existing apart from human hypostatisation (Harman, 2011a: 59 – though it is not clear 
why the ‘object’ is not Harman’s own monolithic lump). Harman’s problem with undermining 
is that it ‘cannot account for the relative independence of objects from their constituent pieces 
or histories,’ as when, for example, an entity shifts its atoms, but nonetheless remains 
recognisable as the same entity (2016a: 9). Overmining, on the other hand, occurs when an 
object becomes conflated with qualities or effects that ‘allows objects no surplus of reality 
beyond whatever they modify, transform, perturb, or create’ (Harman, 2016a: 10). The problem 
with overmining is that the reduction of an object to what it is doing makes it difficult to account 
for how it can change. What all overmining approaches discount, therefore, is the surplus which 
can arise from (in)actions beyond the current configuration of events. Both errors of mining 
can also occur simultaneously, in what Harman terms duomining. Materialism’s tendency to 
reduce objects to a primary substratum, while also rendering them susceptible to mathematical 
capture (Harman, 2016a: 11), is, for Harman, the primary culprit of duomining. Such 
opposition to mathematical determination leads Harman to prefer the excess of the aesthetic 
over the reduction by the scientific: a theme consistent throughout his work.  
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Aesthetic Foundationalism 
 
Finally, it is object-oriented ontology’s persistent opposition to mathematical determination 
which leads Harman to privilege the excess permitted in aesthetic appreciation above the 
reduction of the phenomenon achieved by science. So, while Levinas opposed Heidegger 
through his argument that ethics was primary in philosophy, rather than ontology (Levinas, 
1999), Harman suggests that it is actually aesthetics that is first philosophy (2007a: 221). For 
Harman, the real object is never the object encountered, whether through thinking it or using 
it, because it is always in excess of these modes. He believes that art, and specifically art 
criticism, is a style that gets us closer to the nature of objects than reductive forms of 
materialism. Harman’s exemplar is the now unfashionable art critic Clement Greenberg and 
his opposition to overly–conscious artworks. Greenberg, as Harman puts it, was interested in 
‘making the invisible deep conditions of any medium somehow visible in the content of the 
art’ (2014: 260). This leads Harman to prioritise allusive style above literal description 
(Harman, 2016b). This mode of apperception should not replace science, of course, where 
precision is an imperative. To make the invisible deep conditions of objects perceivable, 
allusive language is necessary. Style, in this sense, is not merely a colour for otherwise staid 
philosophical debates, but an essential tool in drawing out the metaphysical traits of objecthood 
(Harman, 2016b). In one prominent case, Harman demarcates the aesthetic effect of allure. 
Allure is not the name of an aesthetic atmosphere we sense between objects, but a metaphysical 
occurrence warranting serious philosophical attention (Harman, 2005: 143–145).  
 
Thus ‘objects’, Harman writes, ‘are sleeping giants holding their forces in reserve’ (2016: 7). 
Much like it was with Heidegger, Harman is not attempting to put aesthetic knowledge on an 
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equal footing with the sciences. He is instead formulating a mode of contemplating objects 
which retains their essential capacity to always be more than our concepts, terminologies and 
representations permit us to say of them. Such aesthetic foundationalism necessarily engenders 
an attitudinal response to objects, a point to which we will return. Before this we will overview 
Immaterialism’s formation of an object–oriented social theory (OOST). 
 
What is Object Oriented Social Theory? 
 
Immaterialism makes a redacted case for object-oriented ontology’s distinctiveness as a social 
theory by differentiating it from three competing metaphysical frameworks – phenomenology, 
new materialism, and actor network theory. With the emergence and proliferation of 
phenomenology, Harman argues, Western philosophy breaks decisively with ‘the old 
empiricist notion that an object is nothing more than a “bundle of qualities”’ (2016a: 102). The 
book asserts the grounds for object-oriented ontology’s claims to post–phenomenological 
sovereignty, giving the name of OOST (object–oriented social theory) to this new movement. 
The post–phenomenological assertions Harman makes here are consistent with what his earlier 
work, overviewed above, had already established.  
 
Immaterialism then loosely casts ‘New Materialism’ as a rival to OOST, and its named 
proponents (most often Karen Barad, Ann–Marie Mol and Jane Bennett) provide a series of 
philosophical axioms against which the exact opposites are asserted. Thus, Harman holds it to 
be axiomatic for the new materialist that everything is constantly changing whereas for the 
immaterialist stability is the norm; that, for the new materialist, all is contingent whereas for 
the immaterialist, it is non–contingency that prevails; or that, for the new materialist, what a 
thing does is more interesting than what it is, whereas in contrast the immaterialist is primarily 
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interested in what a thing is and what it holds in reserve. In all, Harman provides nine such 
oppositions (2016a: 14–16). ‘New Materialism’ also stands in as an example of what Harman 
calls the error of undermining, that is, the error of explaining what an object is ‘in terms of its 
smaller constituents’ (2016a: 8). 
 
Most of Immaterialism’s remaining space is devoted to object-oriented ontology’s self–
demarcation from Actor Network Theory, which Harman regards as ‘the most important 
philosophical method to emerge since phenomenology in 1900’ (2016a: 1, see also Harman 
2009, 2014). Whereas phenomenology’s break with empiricism provides the basis for the 
mistaken undermining which Harman holds new materialism guilty of, it also provides the 
basis for the mistaken mode of overmining, of which he accuses ANT practitioners in general 
and Bruno Latour in particular. The problem with any overmining approach to knowledge 
production, according to Harman:  
 
is that it allows objects no surplus of reality beyond whatever they modify, transform, 
perturb, or create (2016a: 10). 
 
Rather than focusing upon an object’s effects, in the way of ANT, Harman advocates a 
methodological approach which encounters objects as objects (2016a: 97–107). 
Immaterialism’s demarcation of object-oriented social theory from ANT deems objects to be 
entities which essentially withdraw, in keeping with his aesthetic foundationalism. Withdrawal, 
in such a reading, is not a reflexive capacity that humans have, nor a pessimistic capitulation 
to our solipsistic affliction, but a feature of all objects (e.g. Harman 2010b: 36, 2011c, see 
Dunne 2009). For the immaterialist, social theories which oppose some aspect of human 
subjectivity (e.g. consciousness, freedom, reason), inadvertently champion another, for 
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example vitalism. With these distinctions made, Harman proceeds to affirm OOST’s relevance 
to contemporary social practice by asserting fifteen principles. The following table lists the 
fifteen principles of OOST and presents the justifications underpinning them: 
 
[[Insert table here]] 
  
 Principle Grounds  
1 Objects, Not Actors      The contradistinction from ANT 
2 Immaterialism, Not Materialism The contradistinction from New 
Materialism 
3 An object is better known by its non–
relations than its relations  
The contradistinction from ANT  
4 An object is better known by its proximate 
failures than by its successes  
The contradistinction from ANT 
5 The key to understanding social objects is 
to hunt for their symbioses 
The received account of symbiosis 
6 Symbioses will occur relatively early in 
the life of an object 
The received account of symbiosis 
7 Symbiosis is not infinitely flexible once an 
object’s character is established 
The received account of symbiosis 
8 Symbioses are weak ties that mature into 
strong ones 
The received account of symbiosis 
9 Symbioses are non–reciprocal The received account of symbiosis 
10 Symbioses are asymmetrical The received account of symbiosis 
11 Objects as events are echoes of objects as 
objects 
The contradistinction from ANT 
12 The birth of an object is both reciprocal 
and symmetrical 
The derived account of birth and 
decay 
13 The death of an object arises from the 
excessive strength of its ties 
The derived account of birth and 
decay 
14 The ripening of an object comes from the 
expansion of its symbioses 
The received account of symbiosis 
15 The decadence of an object comes from 
the literalization of its symbioses 
The received account of symbiosis 
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Practicing OOST 
 
The second part of Immaterialism takes the Dutch East India Company as its case study to 
demonstrate how an object-oriented social theory can handle objects differently, 
emblematising its axioms. The Dutch East India Company’s early contractual arrangements 
and political imperatives trigger strong ties that are stable throughout periods of change. These 
grounding events are major – they are ‘symbiotic moments’, where the object forms a 
connection that sets it out on a path dependent course. This allows Harman to claim that other 
materialist approaches are ‘gradualist’, thus always in danger of infinite regress of connections, 
without the ability to differentiate the major ones from the minor ones. Finally, it is the 
excessive strength of the object’s ties can lead to the object’s demise. However, the analysis of 
the VOC through the principles of object-oriented social theory produces a rudimentary 
narrative with no discernable innovation on the level of objects (i.e. the actors are recognizable 
companies, personalities, infrastructures); relations (i.e. the major symbiotic moments are legal 
contracts, infrastructure and formative moments in a human’s life) and time (i.e. there is 
standard chronology from birth to death, with emphasis on human–centric causes and effects).  
In what follows, we propose that the philosophically innovative insights of object–orientation 
fall quite flat when they are mechanically applied to the social, and that a different type of 
posthuman relationism, emerging in social theory, can offer better innovation on these three 
levels. 
 
OOST’s Self–Limitations 
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Introducing Posthuman Relations  
 
Posthuman relationists are realists who draw on contemporary advances in disciplines like 
geology, biology, mathematics and neurology to make the case that non–human reality is not 
a sub-set of human reality. So, like Harman, they share a commitment to an object–oriented 
realism, but, unlike Harman, posthuman relationists occupy an anthropic event horizon: their 
social analyses occur in the shifting, impossible ground between the human and the nonhuman. 
This perspective, as we will show, constitute social objects differently – though not deficiently 
– in comparison with object-oriented social theory. But such work, we continue, recognises not 
just a dynamic of object withdrawal, but a dialectic of object withdrawal and appeal. This, we 
claim, requires a social theoretical ethics of objects alongside OOO’s metaphysics of objects. 
 
One of the reasons why contemporary social theorists are turning towards objects is because 
they produce a ‘gestalt shift’ (Bennett, 2009: 107) in perception. This amounts to a political act 
because it requires us to re–divide the world, to reprioritize matter(s), to create different 
causalities, to follow new agencies, to produce new spacetimes, and to interrupt the ‘mind–
lulling presence of common sense’ (Tsing 2015: 223). While authors such as Tsing and Bennett 
acknowledge the importance of traditional social theory in identifying gross inequalities, they 
also advocate a posthuman relationism that moves from critique to production by, in Bennett’s 
words, ‘formulat[ing] new and surprising connections between modes of existence’ (2007: 
107).  
She continues:  
We might then entertain a set of crazy and not–so–crazy questions:  Did the typical 
American diet play any role in engendering the widespread susceptibility to the 
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propaganda leading up to the invasion of Iraq? Do sand storms make a difference to the 
spread of so–called sectarian violence? Does mercury help enact autism? 
Donna Haraway’s vision of a non–natal kinship similarly speculates upon the modes of 
sociality that a specifically posthumanist relationism can produce: 
 
What if serious adoption practices for and by the elderly became common? What if 
nations that are worried about low birth rates (Denmark, Germany, Japan, Russia, white 
America, more) acknowledged that fear of immigrants is a big problem, and that racial 
purity projects and fantasies drive resurgent pronatalism? (2015: 164, footnote 17).  
Such questions might strike the OOST theorist as stubbornly anthropocentric, mistakenly 
correlationist, even. But they need not. Posthuman relationism is a mode of listening for the 
nonhuman while simultaneously acknowledging the impossibility of fully hearing it. It is 
precisely this impossible position of the posthuman relationist that expands our range of 
socialities, causalities, temporalities and ethics because it contains the stubborn 
anthropomorphic residual within any ‘new’ theory of society. A difference then, between 
Harman’s project of putting ‘object–object relations on exactly the same footing as subject–
object relations’ (2010: 140) and the posthuman relationist project is the level of innovation 
each position adopts in operationalizing its philosophy in the social sphere. In its tendency to 
claim the diametrical opposite to all other materialisms, object-oriented social theory is forced 
to swing the analytic pendulum in the opposite direction; Immaterialism’s readers are subjected 
to an account of the Dutch East India Company object with all the human and ecological 
exploitation spirited away in the name of realism. Posthuman relationism, by contrast, 
recognises an interaction between objective withdrawal and subjective appeal. Donald Moss’ 
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(2016) work on climate change, for example, characterizes the Earth as making an appeal, 
following Freud, in the form of ‘a demand for work’: 
 
When the attention of an experienced person is drawn to the child’s state by this path of 
discharge, [the path of discharge]…acquires a secondary function of the highest 
importance, that of communication, and the initial helplessness of human beings is the 
primal source of all moral motives (Freud, 1895: 318, in Moss, 2016: 192, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Like the child ‘screaming and kicking about’, the appeal made by the earth is a combination of 
demand and accusation which places us all in a complex moral position:  
 
We have been there before. With the help of others, obviously, we escaped from our 
own moments of abject helplessness. We are all of us, of course, deeply reluctant to 
return (Moss, 2016: 192). 
 
But what are we reluctant to return to? For Harman, it is the return to the relation as the sole 
modality of knowing the world – a ‘philosophy of access’ (2011: 3, 2005: 255) from which 
correlationism draws its power. Thus, object-oriented social theory must privilege the essential 
withdrawal of all objects at the very center of social theory. But because social theory is a mode 
of knowledge production, rather than a decontextualised reflection of the world, withdrawal is 
a psychological alibi. In other words, at the very moment when humans have caused a state 
shift in the Earth’s biosphere and are presiding over a mass extinction, we are witness to the 
ascendency of a social theory that massively redistributes agency to the nonhuman and 
promotes withdrawal as the primary mode of Being. Withdrawal is not (just) a cognitive 
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concept; it is, in line with object-oriented ontology’s commitment to aesthetic foundationalism, 
an aesthetic, and as such it stimulates an attitudinal response: one of, yes, humility in the face 
of overwhelming non–human existence, but also passivity, or, as Haraway might put it, a refusal 
to stay with the trouble (see Haraway, 2016). Appeal does not necessarily have to produce a 
paternalistic–arrogant–instrumentalist attitude to the nonhuman. It could foster a normativity 
that withdrawal cannot: responsibility. 
 
Posthuman relationism recognizes the co–constitution of the social and the extra–social, 
between, as Latour (2006) puts it, vaccines and markets, planetary systems and telescopes, 
catastrophes and laws. But this is not a wild, infinite connectionism where everything gets 
linked with everything else as Immaterialism depicts it. All object-making must reach for filter 
that makes certain objects and connections. Feminist science studies demands a normative 
responsibility towards ontological inclusivity and humility. If in Harman’s philosophy 
everything gets determined as an object (including subjects), then the ‘who, how, what, when 
and where’ object-making gets glided over. These interrogatives are object-makers, since there 
is not objective way to make a ‘cut’ in the universe and divide objects out in a way that is 
separate from the apparatus that observe-creates them (see Barad, 2007). Nothing precedes its 
relating to something else, and this makes any study of the socius a prima facie ethical 
obligation: ‘all that is, is the fruit of becoming with…the worlding game on earth, and that game 
must be one of response and respect’ (Haraway, 2008: 17–19). In posthuman relationism, the 
strangeness of nonhuman life acts for the former as a guide to think differently about the social 
by mobilizing new prepositions of connection (‘with’, ‘alongside’, ‘between’ life), working to 
produce new conceptions of society as planetmate, messmate, natureculture, mindbody, thing–
power, oddkin, and so on. It is in this vein that ‘relation’ (in all its variants) becomes ‘the 
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smallest possible patterns for analysis’ – an observation that is, ‘extremely prosaic, relentlessly 
mundane, and exactly how worlds come into being’ (Haraway, 2008: 26).  
 
Symbiosis as social theory 
 
Powerful parallels have been drawn between theories of evolution and theories of social 
change, from Stephen J. Gould’s concept of punctuated equilibrium, (Gersick, 1991), to Serres’ 
ontology of the social as parasitism (2007), to the translation of epigenesis and technogenesis 
in the work of Katherine Hayles (2012). In the search for accounts of how change and creativity 
originate, social theorists often turn to the natural sciences for clues and the phenomenon of 
Serial Endosymbiosis Theory has often been deployed for this very purpose. Harman rightly 
recognizes the debt biologists owe to Lynn Margulis for bringing this still quite controversial 
theory of evolution to the attention of non–biologists. Nevertheless, in contrast to its 
deployment in Immaterialism as a ‘realist’ account of change, symbiosis has long been 
recognised as a theory which demonstrates the co–constitution of the social and the biological 
(eg Hird, 2009, 2010; Haraway, 1995). Since over half of OOST’s fifteen axioms are 
grounded in its account of symbiosis, the remainder of this section foregrounds the 
importance of its bio–economic context. 
Symbiosis scholarship, most prevalent in feminist science studies, provides an account of 
change that undermines the dominant Darwinian story of small variations, random mutation, 
long time scales, natural selection, fitness and incremental development. This is because 
evidence in bacteriology increasingly found that that new organisms were often not discrete, 
but rather stemmed from profound and prolonged symbiotic relationships that have proven 
difficult to analyse (Parisi, 2007). In such instances traits were inherited outside of sexual 
dissemination (ie through digestion, infection, donation, other complex forms of partnering) – 
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processes which called forth vast, amorphous and phylogenetically–mixed symbiotic 
complexes, or ‘consortia’, as opposed to anatomically bounded objects or ‘organisms’. These 
biotic meshes are metabolic, energetic networks rather than systems of information and 
exchange (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005: 386–389; O’Malley, 2014: 1070; Margulis, 1995: 139; 
Haraway, 1995). Rather than thinking of organisms as anatomical or physiological individuals, 
we might instead describe a world composed of ‘holobionts’ (Gilbert et al. 2012: 325) – vast 
and contagious superorganisms – like immune systems, coral reefs or bacterial gut biomes – 
that force a focus on how perceptual, political, social and scientific conditions precede objects. 
To see objects as boundary–work. 
SET continues to provide new ways to think about biological change since novelty, on its 
account, can occur relatively suddenly. (Hird, 2009: 65). Combining the sudden and the unlikely 
with the slow and the gradual, SET complicates the unit of change in order to enrich our 
understanding of it. It opens new ways to think about change because it promotes the idea that 
organisms can change through horizontal inheritance – pairing with unlikely contemporaries to 
create large changes over short time periods with the adaptive advantage of generating novelty 
(Hird, 2009: 65). This is very much against the grain of evolutionary theory proper, where 
evolutionary theorists term ‘non–Darwinian’ any complexity derived from sources other than 
‘by brute mechanical…climbing from the base already built by the efforts of earlier climbing’ 
(Dawkins, 1986: 319, in Hird, 2009: 65). Serial Endosymbiosis Theory is thus important as it 
proposes differential speeds of change – both sudden and unlikely mixes with slow and causal. 
 
The other thing it offers biology, and thus social science, is a new unit of change. Darwinian 
evolutionary theory takes the gene, or individual organism as the unit of change – the 
zoocentric, ‘big like us’ epistemic culture of both science and social science, in contrast to the 
‘weird worldings of protists, archea, eukaryotes’ (Wertheim, 2007). This deconstruction of 
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individuality is the central concept of serial endosymbiosis (Margulis, 1991: 13). What we see 
here is the absolute collapse of organismic boundedness in symbiogenesis; the complexity of 
the assimilation makes it impossible to distinguish borders and autonomous regulatory systems 
without the arbitration of the social – in direct opposition to Harman’s case for an 
‘immaterialism’ that ‘recognises entities at every scale of existence without dissolving them 
into some ultimate constitutive layer’ (Harman, 2016a: 16).  
 
Biological accounts of symbiosis tend to begin with the difficulty in defining what exactly this 
new idea of change was – the unit was unclear, as was the process. The intellectual development 
of symbiosis theory and socio–political theory has been co–constitutive – namely an 
ideological contest between individualism and collectivism in political economy. So contests 
about what symbiosis was developed deeply within a bio–economic–political–social context, 
in the development of socialist and anarchist concept of mutuellisme in the mid 1800s, to 
mutual interactions in natural theology, where ‘nature’s balance’ contrasted with the 
Hobbesian–Maltusian–Darwinian bio–economic concept of struggle for existence in zero–sum 
games of all–against–all (see Sapp, 1994). Perhaps the most famous exponent of this is Peter 
Kropotkin, whose Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1972) cited symbiosis as evidence for 
the benefit of global cooperation towards the common good, the division of labour, protection 
of elements and interdependent organization. This stood in contrast with the ways in which 
evolutionary theory was similarly used to champion individualism and the social policies of 
laissez–faire. 
Thus, the biological and social history of symbiosis argues for the indistinct enmeshment of 
objects that undermines their objecthood in the first place – in this dominant account, symbiosis 
looks more like a turbo–charged synthesis. What Harman misses is the elementary starting 
point for sociologies of science: that social science translates science, just as science translates 
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‘reality’. There are two reasons for this: it is difficult for biology to speak of evolution without 
relying on socially–loaded concepts, and evolutionary processes reciprocally validate social 
models for living and being together. Social theories of change have tended to take the 
prevalence of cost–benefit relations in the natural world as evidence for its naturalization in the 
social world.  But, as Margulis reflects, ‘[t]he benefit/cost people have perverted the science 
with invidious economic analogies’ (Margulis, 1995: 135). It is really no different in symbiosis. 
With the exception of object-oriented social theory, social theories of symbiosis have 
recognised this normative dimension to how it is deployed: describing symbiosis to analogise 
different modes of living socially. Harman uses symbiosis to provide a way to distinguish the 
‘significant’ moments of an object’s life (in his case the Dutch East India Company) from the 
‘insignificant’ ones. But this strategy unintentionally masks the fact that any observation of the 
history of the company–object is the selection process of ‘significances’ according a value–
based criteria.  
Serial Endosymbiosis Theory thus leaves us with four object lessons. The first is that no theory 
of social change, even object-oriented social theory, is going to be a value–free; endosymbiosis 
is a process that is always already highly charged with rich metaphor, entailing a ‘host’ that is 
in an ‘exchange’, ‘relation’ or ‘merger’ with a ‘guest’ – a form of ‘living together’ that becomes 
‘close’ over time. Second, the extraordinary range and nature of these relations can act as 
strategies for other worldings, other ways of being with each other in the cataclysmic endings 
that we now face, and thus have an important normative function for the work of social theory. 
Third, endosymbiosis is a way to think about temporalities far beyond the VOC–object. It is a 
social arrangement that began and continues from a single event, when a bacterium nestled into 
a simple cell, creating an intimacy that has lasted four billion years (Lane, 2015). Fourth, 
endosymbiosis is a template for unlikely intimacies. The bacteria in the gut of a meely bug 
snythesises amino acids for proteins, but it only generates the first two, waiting for the meely 
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bug to do the next three, and so on. The luminescence of the Hawaiian bobtail squid which is 
a gift of its bacterial guest, and gives it a glow that matches the moonlight out in the shallow 
reefs of its home. This glow matching cancels out its shadow, making it invisible to predators. 
These are strange intimacies. In contrast, what object–oriented social theory strongly retains 
are the ‘invidious economic analogies’ of individualism, discreteness, human–timescales and 
a flattened concept of stability that offers no innovation beyond received humanist accounts. 
 
Conclusion  
In the final book of the Dark Forest trilogy, the science–fiction writer Cixin Liu asks the reader 
how humans could even begin to describe the experience of existing in four dimensions. He 
paints a world of infinite openness, a non–object world where nothing has an edge. It would 
appear from cosmological evidence that the vast majority of the universe – a full 85 percent – 
comprises non–baryonic matter that might be very different to standard concepts of the stuff of 
the universe. Seen in this light, the object would seem to be a three–dimensional, 
anthropomorphic phenomenon, and there might be far fewer objects in the universe than we 
imagine.  
Bearing this in mind, it is impossible to make the claim, as Harman does, that the universe is 
made up of objects. We are not cosmologists, and thus we are not so much concerned with this 
metaphysical fallacy, but rather, we wish to use it to demonstrate the way object-oriented 
ontology is stuck in a no–man’s–land of not–quite–nonhuman–not–quite–human. The result is 
that the avenues that it can open, and the analysis of existing phenomena it can provide, are 
limited for both metaphysics and for social theory. As it enters social theory, it commits a 
performative fallacy. Social theory is fundamentally predicated on the socius. As Latour points 
out, the fundamental Latin root of the social– the socius – ought to remind us that social theory 
 20 
is not about homogenous ‘things’, but the association between things. Translating object–
oriented ontology into social theory misses that fundamental starting point of social theory: 
objects come into the social world as expressions of value. This value is negotiated, perceptual, 
political and agentic. This shortcoming is a product of Harman’s philosophical monologue on 
social theoretical practice which might yet be remedied by actual dialogue with social theorists. 
So why has object-oriented ontology become such a popular force in other disciplines? Object-
oriented ontology’s proliferation is the product of the complex interplay between sociological 
and logical factors, including the rise of the philosophical blogosphere and para-academia. 
Tensions within speculative realism’s small world have emerged and so Harman remains the 
only figure from the original tetrad who continues to advocate for it. Harman, that is to say, is 
the only one of the original speculative realists who retained an anti–realist sense of finitude, 
where knowledge can never capture the thing–in–itself 
  
Despite this, the case for a speculative social theory is still compelling. Speculation has a 
history that extends beyond the regular use of the term, and involves a closer attention to 
rationality as the basis of judgement (though this rationality is different from what we 
heretofore knew). However, it seems to have lost many of its original technical characteristics 
turning it, as Ray Brassier rather drily puts it, into ‘the alibi for a doctrine that wishes to spare 
itself the trouble of justification’ (Brassier 2014: 416, see also Brown 2013). While we believe 
the case for speculative social theory can be made, Harman’s version does not offer enough 
innovation to social theory. In order to persuade, Harman needs to attend to the work of 
theorists like Latimer, Haraway, Hird, Puig de la Bellacasa and Bennett, who, informed by 
bacteriology, mycology and pedology, stretch relations to their rational outposts, without 
ignoring their appeals.  
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